

CLASSIFICATION

INFORMATION REPORT

OFFICE OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE

SERIAL NO

B-61-61

DATE OF REPORT

6 March 1961

DATE OF INFORMATION

January-February 1961

OPNAV FORM 3020-2 (REV. 8-60)

FROM

CINCUSNAVEUR REP BERLIN APO 742

SOURCE

NAVAL MEMBER USMILM

EVALUATION

REQUEST NO.

SUBJECT

EAST GERMANY--Soviet-East German Relations

BRIEF (FOR REPORTS OF MORE THAN ONE PAGE, ENTER CAREFUL SUMMARY)

Recent developments in the Soviet Zone, Germany indicate that Soviet control of broad major political interests of the DDR probably has remained unchanged but that control of MFS actions and other internal DDR affairs has gradually decreased to the point where independent action of organizations within the DDR can result in embarrassment for the Soviets. Regardless of the common political view of the East German hierarchy with the Soviet view the DDR has increased its internal power to a degree with which the Soviets find at times difficult to cope.

1. An MfS agent defected from Potsdam on 5 February 1961. In addition to biographical sketches and information on the activities of the USMLM Potsdam servants as informants, he revealed the following information concerning MfS organization:

a. Department R, Referat 3, is responsible for the recruitment and handling of informants in the various Military Missions, American, British, and French, both in Potsdam and West Berlin. (In an effort to build up an informant net for future operations against Capitalist embassies, should they ever be set up in East Germany.) Department R. is located in Potsdam, Bayerstrasse 7. (No offices in Normannenstrasse MfS Headquarters). Department R is an independent Department under the Headquarters of the MfS in Normannenstrasse, Ministry of MfS.

b. Referat 1 is for evaluations of reports, receive reports from the Glienicke bridge when Military Mission cars cross same, receive reports from cities in East Germany which report on presence of Military Mission vehicles (VP, BV's etc). Some agents in this Section are responsible for definite areas

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DISTRIBUTION BY ORIGINATOR

REP GER, CINCUSNAVEUR x

CLASSIFICATION

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such as, Erfurt and Sohl; Dresden and Karl Marx Stadt; Neubrandenburg, Schwerin and Rostock; Magdeburg, Potsdam and Halle; Cottbus, Frankfurt/Oder and Leipzig. Keep contact with Operations Chief in Districts, Chief of Dept II, and persons in MfS at BV level who are responsible for Military Missions. Also responsible for the recruitment and handling sources who reside or work in the vicinities of known targets of the Military Missions.

c. Referat 2: "Steergruppe". Responsible for tailing the Military Missions vehicles on their trips in the East Zone. Offices in the attic rooms of Bayerstrasse, with vehicles distributed in garages in various locations in Potsdam. e.g. in Klein Weinmeisterstrasse, near the corner of Messestrasse (4 or 5 garages in a row). Formerly had Opel Kapitans and Mercedes (Blaue Pheil) in 1960. In approximately March 1960 they received 3 or 4 new BMW (West Manufacture) vehicles, 2 light green ones and 1 dark blue one.

d. Referat 3: "Operative Apparat" recruits and handles only sources. Consisting of Section Chief and 6 MfS agents, plus one female interpreter. Each speciality has 2 agents:

Sachgebiat (speciality) A: American Military Mission.
B: British Military Mission.
C: French Military Mission.

e. Referat 4: Wirtschafts Truppe: Responsible for keeping the cars in order, material supplies for the Department, supplying chauffeurs, picking up money and paying agents, etc.

f. "U" (Symbol of this letter is not known or its meaning) This section is responsible surveillances and clandestine observations. (e.g. Vehicle surveillance by Referat 2 is quite open and makes no offer to hide from the Military Mission cars. But "U" is completely undercover and clandestine. Their agents are not allowed to visit any MfS installation, so not compromise themselves to their own colleagues. When an informant reports that a Mission car is going to Leipzig for instance to stay for about 3 days, then "U" sends an advance party, with the mission to observe the Mission personnel on their entire stay in Leipzig, and identify any persons with whom the Mission people get into contact.

2. The following information was revealed by the MfS defector concerning Soviet-East German relations:

a. In January 1960, when the members of the USMLM received the new identification documents from the Soviets, which were no longer issued by the Soviet Military Occupation, but by the German Democratic Republic, rumors started to fly fast and furious. It was general rumor in Dept R and also in officials meetings, often lead by the Dept Chief, that the existance of the USMLM no longer was founded on law, with the same intimation that the Occupations Forces in West Berlin also have no legal rights. For this reason these new ID documents were issued. If the West had accepted these documents, then the East would have insisted that the Troops and the missions be withdrawn. There were discussions of how this was to be done, but the german opinion was that the East German Government should simply order that they withdraw, but that the Russians were afraid to take this step. The Russians did not get into ~~discussions~~ discussions with any persons that Source knew on this subject.

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The documents were taken back, and the workers of Dept R were disappointed. The chiefs excused this cowardly action by stating that the East was so strong that they could afford to leave the missions and the troops as they were.

b. No concrete statements about getting rid of the missions were made by any of the chiefs of Department R. Source believes that all MfS believe that the Soviets are condoning the military missions to protect the existence of the Soviet missions in the FRG. Chief of Dept R is HEINRICH and he is a good friend of BEATOR, Deputy minister of MfS, responsible for Main Depts, II, V, Dept R, and usually repeats the political of BEATOR, who did not make any great mention about getting rid of the military missions.

c. Often discuss harassment action, e.g. after LEBANON, when demonstrations under the leadership of MfS were taken against the embassys. But ~~everything is only rumor~~ everything is only rumor. Sometimes action is taken. Last June 1960 the agents of the MfS stole the boats of the Military Mission in Potsdam. They are still missing, but MfS Dept R, Referat 4 (U) have them stored in one of their store houses. Responsible for this action was MfS agent FLIESIG, at the direction of MfS Dept R Chief HEINRICH. In the British Mission it was discussed to poison the pigs, but this was not carried out. In Autumn 1960 the MfS had orders to start harassment of the British Mission, to show that the British Military Mission was conducting espionage. A British vehicle was turned over in this action, and documents & taken out of the car, later shown by Walter Ulbricht at a press conference, including photo camera etc. (All documents had the heading "On her Majesty's Service".) The Americans were not harassed, as the MfS already had documents against the Americans. Usually this lead to fist fights with the British who were trying to destroy the films. All were members of the MfS who got into fist fights with the British. All members of Dept R. Source believes this action was undertaken without the knowledge of the Russians, who were quite angry with the MfS. Shortly after this the Russians did not come to the MfS offices and did not give the MfS any more material. Took a couple of months before the Russians showed up again.

d. Russians usually gave the MfS information when a mission car crossed the Glienicke Bridge, so that the MfS harassment cars could take up the chase. Source believes that if the Allies had weakened on any harassment actions by the MfS, then the MfS would only have increased these until they could get the military missions out. Source does not know of any immediate plans against the military missions. MfS waited to observe American action. Waited for the return to the ZI of Col. McQUAIL and the replacement of Col. von PAUL (Ernest). Wanted to wait to see what action von PAUL would take. Special action by the East German government or by the MfS is not planned as far as source is knowledgeable.

USMIM in Potsdam, indigineous personnel.

House meister	MfS informant
2 cooks,	1 cook is informant
3 waitresses	3 waitresses are informants
1 fireman	1 fireman is informant
2 cleaning women	no cleaning woman in informant.

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OPNAV FORM 3820-2 (C) (REV. 5-55)

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3. An incident with MfS surveillance personnel on 4 February 1961 (Enclosure (1)) indicated independent action on the operating level of MfS and East German-Soviet relations which contradict theories that rigid Soviet control extends down to all levels of endeavor in the Soviet Zone, Germany.

a. One MfS person and a VOPO from Sternberg departed the scene in the direction of Schwerin at 1830. After an absence of approximately two and one half hours the MfS party returned presumably with instructions from headquarters in Schwerin to permit the USMLM tour to proceed.

b. MfS personnel who take measures, when surveilling USMLM, to avoid visual sighting by Soviet External Relations Branch officers in the presence of USMLM officer, entered the Schwerin Kommandantura thereby placing themselves in the awkward position of being identified to the Soviets by the Naval Member, USMLM.

c. The Soviet Duty Officer conducted an investigation of the incident during which he supported the USMLM officer and outwardly treated the MfS personnel as criminals guilty of a serious crime.

d. A local East German investigator in Schwerin under the direction of the Soviet Duty Officer pursued the issue vigorously to the extreme embarrassment of the MfS personnel.

e. Under the pressure of the Soviet Duty Officer and the local East German investigator the MfS party lost control of his temper and threatened the Naval Member, USMLM for reporting the use of firearms. This outbreak resulted in increased probing on the part of the Soviets and East German authority.

f. The Soviet Duty Officer did not demand USMLM passes, but the East German investigator forced MfS personnel X under protest to present their papers.


g. The Deputy Commandant at one point in the discussion with the Naval Member, USMLM stated in desperation that although it might be difficult to believe, the Soviets have no actual control over the actions of many East German organizations. This statement was made aside from his general comments along the usual party lines.

h. Soviet Military Inspection personnel halted the USMLM tour and MfS surveillance personnel along the return route to Potsdam and checked documents of the occupants of both vehicles. This procedure is not customary since Soviet military personnel have never interfered with MfS vehicles.

i. In a meeting with Chief, USMLM, Colonel Kozlovskiy, SERB, extended an indirect apology for the incident stating further that CINC, Group of Soviet Forces, Germany would verify the apology if desired. Enclosure (2) contains the reaction of Chief, Soviet Military Liaison Mission, Frankfurt in accepting a letter from CINCUSAREUR for delivery to CINC, GSFG referring to the incident.

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OPNAV FORM 3820-2 (C) (REV. 6-55)

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Source of Information: Naval Member, USMLM.

Preparing Officer's Comment:

1. Enclosure (1) was written at the direction of Chief, USMLM for delivery to SERB since Chief, USMLM informed Col. Kozlovskiy that he would send Col. Kozlovskiy a memo from the Naval Member, USMLM to the Chief outlining the incident. Chief, USMLM deleted and changed several portions before delivery which did not affect the veracity of the memo.

a. The Soviet Duty Officer at the request of the Naval Member, placed a long distance call to USMLM Potsdam. The call was authentic since the Naval Member could hear the usual operators in routing the call, but the Potsdam Mission House emitted a busy signal. Later upon arrival of the Deputy Commandant communication facilities were requested by the Naval Member, but the Deputy Commandant denied the request stating that he had only facilities for local calls.

b. Major Kruglov interrupted Major Nizkopoklonny to accuse the USMLM tour of conducting photography in Schwerin, and driving earlier with a dirty vehicle which had been later cleaned. Both allegations were false, and Major Nizkopoklonny cut off Major Kruglov with the statement that the charges were immaterial to the incident.

c. The Naval Member stated that if the Soviets took no action to control the situation, it might become necessary to request a Soviet escort to Potsdam rather than a direct request for an escort as indicated in enclosure (1).

2. The telephone conversations overheard by the Naval Member including a call to the Commandant in Schwerin in which the Commandant's voice could be heard indicated that during the two and one half hour absence of the MfS party and VOPO from the ~~the~~ scene of the incident, the Soviet Kommandantura had not been informed of the incident and did not ~~the~~ learn of the incident until the Naval Member reported it to the Soviets. East German authorities obviously decided to attempt to settle the matter without Soviet knowledge hoping that when freed the USMLM tour would return to Potsdam without reporting the incident to ~~the~~ the Soviets.

3. Since the incident of 4 February and the defection on 5 February USMLM has not experienced overt surveillance by MfS.

Prepared:

J. A. Fahey
J. A. FAHEY
CDR USN

Forwarded:

B. Nethercott
B. NETHERCOTT
CDR USNR



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OPNAV FORM 3820-2 (C) (REV. 6-55)

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ENCLOSURE (1)

6 February 1961

SUBJECT: Memorandum for the Chief, USMLM

FROM: Commander Fahey

At 1700 hours on 4 February 1961, USMLM car number 11 with Commander Fahey and Capt Dunn departed Schwerin for Guestrow on Route #104. The USMLM car was followed from Schwerin by a black Mercedes, license registration number IA 13-10, with two occupants in civilian clothes. Proceeding east of Sternberg on Route #104 the surveillance vehicle repeatedly sounded its horn and blinked its lights. At this point the speed of USMLM car was between 70 and 80 kilometers per hour. The surveillance car pulled alongside the USMLM car and signalled the USMLM car to stop by holding a no entry sign (white circle with red border). Capt Dunn, who was driving, was told by Commander Fahey to slow down to a stop. This was accomplished after the two cars collided. It was Commander Fahey's impression that the collision was caused by the surveillance vehicle. One of the civilian occupants approached the USMLM car and broke into a verbal tirade in German not understandable to the USMLM officers. The occupant ~~return~~ returned to his car and USMLM officers again proceeded eastward on route #104. After five minutes three miles east of Witzen the surveillance car again sounded his horn and blinked his lights. Capt Dunn was instructed by Commander Fahey to pull to the right and slow to a stop. The speed at this point was 65 kilometers per hour in a wooded area. The surveillance car pulled alongside the USMLM Mission car as soon as Capt Dunn had moved to the right side of the road. The cars collided sharply and it was Commander Fahey's impression that the surveillance car turned into USMLM car. The surveillance car stopped ahead of the USMLM car at an angle thirty degrees to the direction of the road. Both civilian occupants dismounted from the surveillance car and verbally abused the USMLM officers. Capt Dunn during this discussion asked the civilian driver for identification, a request which was ignored. The driver of the surveillance team returned to straighten his car. When the surveillance car was straightened, Capt Dunn drove to the left and moved past the surveillance car. The civilian passenger immediately reached to the front of his trousers, withdrew his gun, and as the rear of the USMLM car passed to his right a loud pistol report was heard by both USMLM officers. The civilian surveillance person was approximately 15 feet from the USMLM car at the time of firing. USMLM car stopped and the driver of the surveillance car approached the tour car drawing a pistol from under his belt. As he did so he pulled the front of his shirt from under his trousers. He aimed his gun in the direction of Commander Fahey with a furious expression on his face. The driver then returned to the ~~surveillance~~ surveillance vehicle and backed his rear bumper flush with the front bumper of USMLM car. The civilian occupants of the surveillance car verbally abused the USMLM officers then returned to the car.

A VOPO who apparently was called by radio to the scene arrived at 1810. He was heard by Commander Fahey to inform the driver of the surveillance vehicle that the car was a Mission car and could not be kept at this location. Also the word Commandatura was heard by Commander Fahey. The civilian passenger then entered the VOPO car, proceeded with the VOPO in the direction of Schwerin on Route #104 at 1830.

ENCLOSURE (1) to CINCUSNAVEUR REP BERLIN IR B-61-61 of 6 Mar 61 Page 1 of 3

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OPNAV FORM 3820.2 (C) (REV. 6 58)

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ENCLOSURE (1)

At 2055 a car was seen approaching from the rear. The car stopped approximately three hundred yards to the rear of the USMLM car and ~~XXXXXX~~ reversed its direction to Schwerin. Shortly thereafter the surveillance passenger approached the scene of the two parked cars from the rear on foot, joined his colleague, and until 2105 talked to the driver. At 2105 the ~~at~~ driver approached the USMLM officers and stated slowly (on request) that the USMLM car could proceed, remaining below ninety kilometers per hour on the open road and fifty kilometers in town.

Commander Fahey decided to return to Schwerin in order to report the incident to the Soviet Commandant. The surveillance car followed. At 2200 hours Commander Fahey entered the Commandatura, reported the incident to Capt Akhimov, and requested telephone facilities to notify Chief, USMLM. Capt Akhimov attempted to reach the Commandant without ~~XXXXXX~~ success, then called a German-Russian interpreter and the local civilian police chief. The civilian surveillance driver entered the room in the meantime at the same time with Soviet Capt of the military vehicle inspection. The woman interpreter arrived with civilian identified as a member of the local police. The Soviet Duty Officer informed the police officer of the incident as presented by Commander Fahey. The surveillance driver denied firing a weapon and was asked for his identification which he showed to the police officer. Commander Fahey observed that the driver was not questioned about having a weapon and so informed the Duty Officer who in turn directed the local police officer to ask about the possession of a weapon. The police officer asked the unidentified civilian if he had a weapon and was answered in the negative. The Soviet Capt of the military vehicle inspection then departed to bring the surveillance passenger into the office. The surveillance passenger arrived and denied that he fired a pistol, returned to his car to bring back a black ~~XXXXXX~~ square plastic flashlight which he claimed must have been mistaken for a weapon.

After one half hour Major Nizkopoklonny and Major Kruglov entered the building, shook hands with all persons present, and requested that the USMLM officers accompany him to the Commandat's office. In the office, Capt Akhimov factually presented the incident to Maj Nizkopoklonny who informed Commander Fahey that it was not possible that the USMLM officers were fired upon. Commander Fahey informed Maj Nizkopoklonny that he personally saw both weapons and that one was fired by the x civilian passenger at close range. Commander Fahey further stated that the Soviet's had a saying "The truth is brighter than the sun" and yet the Major in stating that such an incident was impossible was in effect stating that he did not believe Commander Fahey's statement. The Major retreated to the position that he was indicating surprise rather than disbelief.

Major Nizkopoklonny then stated that if the incident had ~~involved~~ involved Soviets, action would be taken by Soviets; further that this was a matter involving Germans and therefore could be settled by the German police. Commander Fahey requested a

[REDACTED]

ENCLOSURE (1) to CINCUSNAVEUR REP BERLIN IR B-61-61 of 6 March 1961

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ENCLOSURE (1)

Soviet escort to Potsdam since he was certain that the same individuals would follow the USMLM car to Potsdam. The request was denied with a verbal indication that a safe return was assured.

Commander Fahey stated that since he was a member of US Military Liaison Mission to the CINC, Group of Soviet Forces, he felt it proper to report such a serious incident to the local Commandant and that he would report the incident to Chief, USMLM by telephone, then return to Potsdam.

The USMLM officers departed from the building and found the surveillance vehicle with the same occupants parked behind them in front of the Commandatura. Commander Fahey proceeded to a hotel, called Potsdam, and returned to Potsdam at 2335 followed by the black Mercedes, license registration IA 13-10 with the same occupants who had brandished weapons and fired one weapon at 1730. No further incidents occurred en route to Potsdam.

At no time did the unidentified civilian following USMLM vehicle produce to USMLM officers any identification, even when so requested, or other evidence of authority to stop USMLM personnel.

J. A. FAHEY
CDR USN

[REDACTED]

ENCLOSURE (1) to CINCUSNAVEUR REP BERLIN IR B-61-61 of 6 March 1961

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ENCLOSURE (2)

HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES ARMY, EUROPE
CIVIL AFFAIRS DIVISION
Allied Contact Section
APO 757 US Forces

DISTR: 24Feb61
INTEL
USMLM

AEACA-AC

23 February 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR: CIVIL AFFAIRS OFFICER

COPY FOR: OPERATIONS BRANCH

SUBJECT: Visit to SMLM.

At 221030 February 1961, I delivered a letter from the Chief of Staff for transmittal to GSFG by SMLM, together with acceptances and regrets for the Soviet Army Day Reception. Colonel Chernikov expressed satisfaction at the terms of the letter and reinforced the apology ~~at~~ which GSFG had made, saying that he regretted the action of "the two policemen," and adding that "nothing justified the discharge of firearms."

Colonel Chernikov himself raised the question of domestic help by asking whether he was about to lose any of his personnel. I replied that I had received one complaint from the Chief Cook, whom I had referred to his superiors at the Mission, but that I had not considered that the cook was about to resign. Colonel Chernikov stated that he referred to two sisters who has worked at the Mission for a number of ~~xxx~~ years. Colonel Chernikov stated that he knew Colonel Von Pawel was short of help at Potsdam, and that SERB was making every effort to see that he received his full complement of personnel. Labor is in short supply in Potsdam, it was explained. (COMMENT: This seizure of the initiative by the Chief, SMLM could indicate that the previous day's conversation ~~between~~ between Heidelberg and USMLM had been intercepted at TREYENBRITZEN and relayed to SMLM, Frankfurt.

Colonel Chernikov asked how much we paid his German workers. I stated that it depended on such factors as the level of skill used, the length of service, certain commutation allowances, etc.

Colonel Chernikov was cordial, and stated that he believed there would be a summit conference, despite "some misunderstanding" over the Congo question.

EDWARD A. RAYMOND
Lt Colonel, GS
Chief, Allied Contact Section

ENCLOSURE (2) to CINCUSNAVEUR REP BERLIN IR B-61-61 of 6 March 1961

CINCUSNAVENIR
BERLIN

B-61-C-61

6 March 1961

1. Prepare no DUPLICATE. Do not staple to report. Use plain second sheet when necessary.
2. Do not use REMARKS space below to suggest additional routing or O&A action. Such suggestions may be made on the routing slip.
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PART A. To be completed by Evaluating Desks.

EVALUATING DESK	VALUE OF INFORMATION	EVALUATING DESK	RELIABILITY OF INFORMATION
N3C-II	I. OF CONSIDERABLE VALUE	N3C-2	1. CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES
	II. OF ROUTING VALUE		2. PROBABLY TRUE
	III. OF SLIGHT VALUE		3. POSSIBLY TRUE
	IV. OF NO VALUE, See Remarks		4. TRUTH DOUBTFUL
	V. NEW INFORMATION, VALUE UNDETERMINED		5. IMPROBABLE REPORT
	VI. DOCUMENTARY, CONTINUED Forwarding Desired		6. RELIABILITY CANNOT BE JUDGED

REMARKS: Only remarks of interest to the originator of the report shall be typed on this form. Remarks are not to be construed as a controlled request for information. Any remarks which add substantially to the report by confirming, denying, correcting, amplifying or interpreting the information contained therein should be typed on OPNAV FORM 820-2B for distribution to all addressees of the basic report. Refer to effective edition of ONI INSTRUCTION 65213.

Op-922N3C Comment: 11 April 1961 - CONFIDENTIAL - Report provides an extremely interesting glimpse of the other side of the coin with re. MFS/Soviet relationships. The detailed account of the 4 February 1961 gun shooting incident provided by enclosure (1) had not previously been seen. CONFIDENTIAL

A. J. Zulieve
A. J. ZULIEVE

PART B. To be completed by appropriate desk.

1. COLLECTION	2. DISSEMINATION	3. ANY DESK WITH COGNIZANCE OVER MATERIAL
<input type="checkbox"/> REQUEST NO. COMPLETE AND CANCELLED <input type="checkbox"/> DUE DATE OF REQUEST NO. _____ <input type="checkbox"/> EXTENDED TO _____ <input type="checkbox"/> REQUEST NO. PARTIALLY ANSWERED <input type="checkbox"/> INADEQUATE SUMMARY	<input type="checkbox"/> INADEQUATE LATERAL DISTRIBUTION SEE REMARKS	<input type="checkbox"/> SUBMIT ADDITIONAL INFORMATION AS AVAILABLE <input type="checkbox"/> OPNAV FORM 820-2 IMPROPERLY PREPARED OR USED, SEE REMARKS <input type="checkbox"/> INADEQUATE COMMENT, SEE REMARKS
REMARKS		

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